社論丨中國(guó)企業(yè)有力回?fù)裘绹?guó)制裁

While US sanctions have choked the supply of US chips to Huawei, they have made it almost impossible for Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp to obtain US technology. So when Huawei launched its flagship device, Mate 60 Pro, which reportedly includes a new 5G Kirin 9000s processor, the domestic market and consumers seemed to hail it as a major breakthrough.

美國(guó)制裁遏制了美國(guó)對(duì)華為的芯片供應(yīng)，同時(shí)也使中芯國(guó)際集成電路制造有限公司幾乎無法獲得美國(guó)技術(shù)。因此，當(dāng)華為推出旗艦設(shè)備Mate 60 Pro，并據(jù)稱該產(chǎn)品包括一個(gè)新的5G麒麟9000s處理器時(shí)，國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)和消費(fèi)者將其視為一個(gè)重大突破。

US Congressman Michael McCaul's demand at a briefing at the US embassy in The Hague on Wednesday that the SMIC "warrants investigation" explains why both Huawei and the SMIC have kept a low profile on the issue. While US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said he needed "more information" on the precise "character and composition" of the Kirin chip, McCaul asserted, without having any evidence, that "it sure looks like it did" violate US sanctions — a premise that is based on presumption of guilt.

9月6日，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)議員邁克爾·麥考爾在美國(guó)駐海牙大使館的一次簡(jiǎn)報(bào)會(huì)上要求對(duì)中芯國(guó)際“進(jìn)行調(diào)查”，這解釋了為什么華為和中芯國(guó)際在這個(gè)問題上都保持低調(diào)。美國(guó)國(guó)家安全顧問杰克·沙利文說他需要“更多信息”來了解麒麟芯片的確切“特性和組成”，麥考爾則在沒有任何證據(jù)的情況下斷言“它看起來確實(shí)”違反了美國(guó)制裁——這是一個(gè)基于有罪推定的前提。

True to its colors, and based again on presumption of guilt, the US administration is seeking more information on Mate 60 Pro, according to CNN, possibly to take legal action against Huawei or the SMIC or both.

據(jù)美國(guó)有線電視新聞網(wǎng)報(bào)道，美國(guó)政府正在尋求有關(guān)Mate 60 Pro的更多信息，可能是為了對(duì)華為或中芯國(guó)際或兩者采取法律行動(dòng)。

Both Sullivan and McCaul should know that the SMIC was put on the US Entity List in December 2020 during the last days of the Donald Trump administration, limiting the supply or transfer of US technology to it. That means it is almost impossible that the SMIC's 7 nm foundry was made using US technologies. Or are the US political leaders suggesting the United States will use long-arm jurisdiction to target the legal business of the two Chinese companies?

沙利文和麥考爾應(yīng)該知道，在唐納德·特朗普政府執(zhí)政的最后幾天，中芯國(guó)際于2020年12月被列入美國(guó)商務(wù)部出口管制實(shí)體清單，限制向其供應(yīng)或轉(zhuǎn)讓美國(guó)技術(shù)。這意味著中芯國(guó)際的7納米晶圓代工廠幾乎不可能使用美國(guó)技術(shù)?；蛘哒f，美國(guó)政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人是在暗示美國(guó)將使用長(zhǎng)臂管轄來針對(duì)這兩家中國(guó)公司的合法業(yè)務(wù)？

The US used long-arm jurisdiction to cripple Japan's Toshiba in the 1980s, enfeeble France's Alston in 2013 and deal a big blow to Germany's Siemens in 2018, all on flimsy grounds and to protect American enterprises.

美國(guó)在20世紀(jì)80年代利用長(zhǎng)臂管轄權(quán)削弱了日本東芝公司，在2013年削弱了法國(guó)阿爾斯通公司，在2018年重創(chuàng)了德國(guó)西門子公司，所有這些都是以站不住腳的理由和為了保護(hù)美國(guó)企業(yè)。

In 2019, the Trump administration targeted Huawei with even harsher measures, banning all US enterprises from supplying advanced chips to the Chinese company. Against this background, Chinese researchers' breakthrough, as demonstrated by Huawei's Mate 60 Pro, is a fitting reply to the US' beggar-thy-neighbor policies.

2019年，特朗普政府針對(duì)華為采取了更加嚴(yán)厲的措施，禁止所有美國(guó)企業(yè)向這家中國(guó)公司供應(yīng)先進(jìn)芯片。在此背景下，中國(guó)科研人員以華為Mate 60 Pro為代表的突破，恰恰是對(duì)美國(guó)以鄰為壑政策的回應(yīng)。

The most effective resistance against the US' long-arm jurisdiction is to invest in research and development and produce one's own high-tech products.

對(duì)美國(guó)長(zhǎng)臂管轄最有效的抵抗就是投資研發(fā)，生產(chǎn)自己的高科技產(chǎn)品。

For too long the world has been suffering from the US' vicious long-arm jurisdiction. It's time now for Chinese companies to make more technological breakthroughs and break the US' monopoly in different fields and end its global hegemony.

長(zhǎng)期以來，世界一直深受美國(guó)惡性長(zhǎng)臂管轄之害。現(xiàn)在是中國(guó)企業(yè)取得更多技術(shù)突破，打破美國(guó)在不同領(lǐng)域的壟斷，結(jié)束其全球霸權(quán)的時(shí)候了。

Chip

英/t??p/美/t??p/

n.芯片

Semiconductor

英/?semik?n?d?kt?(r)/ 美/?semik?nd?kt?r/

n.半導(dǎo)體